Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mental states: Mental states are internal states of mind that include thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations, and perceptions. They are subjective experiences that cannot be directly observed by others. See also Brain states, Brain, Thoughts, Thinking, Cognition, Consciousness, Perception, Sensation, Emotions, Behavior._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gareth Evans on Mental States - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 526 Mental state/inner state/knowledge/Evans: (...) the subject can easily acquire knowledge about its inner informational states: he/she must only re-apply the process of conceptualization. Frank I 527 But with the former, all knowledge, which does not belong to it, is excluded. The subject tries to determine, how it would judge, if it had no such accompanying information. The result will necessarily be closely linked to the content of the information state. But this condition has not become an object! There is no state of information that is related to the inner state as this internal state is related to that of the world. (> asymmetry, >analogies) (> mind/mind state). Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Evans
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28